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BECOMING A COSMOPOLITAN LAWYER 
John Flood* & Peter D. Lederer*
INTRODUCTION 
* 
The practice of law has become increasingly globalized over the last 
forty years.  Law firms, although national in origin, now depict themselves 
as global, international, or regional.1  Most of the lawyers practicing in 
these firms are educated and trained in one jurisdiction but work globally.  
True, the market for LL.M. degrees has prompted inter-jurisdictional 
exchanges in legal education, so we find increasing numbers of law 
students educated in civil law systems migrating to common law 
jurisdictions.2  But as a whole, the legal profession has come to 
globalization gradually, led there by client demand rather than an inherent 
desire to supply global services.  If we compare the spread of the law 
practice to that of accounting and management consulting, we can see that 
law has remained a cottage industry to a large extent.3
Talking about the globalization of law ordinarily means examining 
structures, organizations, developments in professionalism, cultural modes 
of production, educational systems, and the like.  If we focus this 
examination on the people who populate the legal industry, a different view 
emerges.  This is similar to the anthropological distinction between etic and 
emic perspectives.
 
4
 
*  Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Westminster School of Law.  Both authors 
are grateful to the University of Miami School of Law for its support of their research. 
  Globalization focuses on the etic, the view from 
**  Visiting Practitioner in Residence, University of Miami School of Law.   
 1. One only has to peruse their websites to see the claims they make.  For instance, 
Clifford Chance says, “[W]e pride ourselves on combining the highest global standards with 
local expertise.” See About Us, CLIFFORD CHANCE, http://www.cliffordchance.com/about_
us.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 2. See generally Carole Silver, The Variable Value of U.S. Legal Education in the 
Global Legal Services Market, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2011) (noting that civil law 
students study law in the United States to learn English and to network); John Flood, Legal 
Education in the Global Context:  Challenges from Globalization, Technology and Changes 
in Government Regulation, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD (2011), http://www.legalservicesboard.
org.uk/news_publications/latest_news/pdf/lsb_legal_education_report_flood.pdf (discussing 
the flow of graduate law students throughout the world). 
 3. John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers:  The Role of Elite Law Firms in International 
Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 49–50 (2007). 
 4. The distinctions between emic and etic can be traced to the nineteenth century, but 
they are crystallized in KENNETH L. PIKE, LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1967) and MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL 
MATERIALISM:  THE STRUGGLE FOR A SCIENCE OF CULTURE (1979). See also THOMAS N. 
HEADLAND, KENNETH L. PIKE & MARVIN HARRIS, EMICS AND ETICS:  THE INSIDER/OUTSIDER 
DEBATE (1990). 
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outside.  In this Article, we argue that to speak of becoming a cosmopolitan 
lawyer requires the emic perspective, that from the interior.  The emic view 
is essential to understanding modern developments in legal practice and 
lawyering because it gives a voice to modes of thinking and thus permits us 
to see inside what we are studying.5
There are different ways of taking the emic approach.  One is the use of 
ethnography or participant observation, which opens up everyday life to 
view, but that is useful primarily to learn about the present states of action 
and structures.
 
6
We focus on the process of becoming a cosmopolitan lawyer.  We 
consider this important because today’s lawyers must be cosmopolitan if 
they are to function in a highly interrelated and globalized world.  
Parochialism becomes unsustainable in a modern world where professions 
generally have become more globalized.  Cosmopolitanism is important 
because while professional associations such as partnerships have been a 
feature of western business life, they are not universal structures.  Indeed, as 
professions have been transported to Asia and elsewhere, they have 
undergone transformations.
  What if we want to go back in time to discern the origins 
and developments of actions and structures?  This is where strategies such 
as oral history come into play.  Oral history is emic, intensive, and provides 
a plenitude of data for analysis.  This is the approach we adopt in this 
Article. 
7
Professions have traditionally had a connection to the wider world.  
Cosmopolitanism embraces this connection through its moral commitment 
to the universal human community.  This commitment is apparent in the 
early history of cosmopolitanism.
 
8
the Cynics of the fourth century BC, who first coined the expression 
cosmopolitan, “citizen of the cosmos.”  The formulation was meant to be 
paradoxical, and reflected the general Cynic skepticism toward custom 
and tradition.  A citizen . . . belonged to a particular polis, a city to which 
he or she owed loyalty.  The cosmos referred to the world, not in the sense 
  Kwame Anthony Appiah traces the term 
cosmopolitanism back to 
 
 5. Consider the example of a London-based Clifford Chance lawyer, in charge of the 
acquisition of an African mobile telephone company, who received a Dutch law degree and 
began working in the New York office.  Using an emic approach, we can learn that the 
national origin of his education did not matter because his most useful technical knowledge 
was his proficiency with the law firm’s own documents. See generally John Flood, 
Transnational Lawyering:  Clients, Ethics and Regulation, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE:  
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 176 (Lynn Mather & Leslie Levin eds., 2012).   
 6. Ethnography is “a commitment to the first-hand experience and exploration of a 
particular social or cultural setting on the basis of (though not exclusively by) participant 
observation.  Observation and participation (according to circumstance and the analytic 
purpose at hand) remain the characteristic feature of the ethnographic approach.” Editorial 
Introduction to HANDBOOK OF ETHNOGRAPHY 4–5 (Paul Atkinson et al. eds., 2007 ed.). 
 7. See generally Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring:  International and 
Local Law Firms in China’s Corporate Law Market, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771 (2008) 
(discussing how Chinese lawyers have adapted the western corporate law firm model to local 
conditions). 
 8. See Gerard Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination:  Critical Cosmopolitanism and 
Social Theory, 57 BRIT. J. SOC. 25, 28 (2006). 
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of the earth, but in the sense of the universe.  Talk of cosmopolitanism 
originally signaled, then, a rejection of the conventional view that every 
civilized person belonged to a community among communities.9
Stoic cosmopolitanism was influential, contributing to Alexander the 
Great’s conquering drive eastwards and the later rise of the Roman 
Empire.
 
10  It also found a place in the Enlightenment and in the birth of the 
United States, by advocating republican principles and a form of universal 
citizenry.11
Modern cosmopolitanism, according to David Held, “recognizes each 
person as an autonomous moral agent entitled to equal dignity and 
consideration.”
 
12  It is founded on eight principles:  (1) equal worth and 
dignity; (2) active agency; (3) personal responsibility and accountability; 
(4) consent; (5) collective decision making about public matters through 
voting procedures; (6) inclusiveness and subsidiarity; (7) avoidance of 
serious harm; and (8) sustainability.13  These principles are articulated 
through conversation, which “helps people get used to one another.”14  
Cross-cultural conversations do not require universals but only something 
in common.15
The subject of this Article is a person who embodies the intrinsic and 
institutional aspects of cosmopolitanism and globalization.  With respect to 
globalization, we are primarily concerned with the changes that have 
occurred since the end of the Second World War.  These include the rise of 
the welfare state, the burgeoning of international institutions such as the 
United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, 
along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and state-parallel 
organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the reinvigorated Bank for International 
Settlements, and the international finance group G7.  During this period, 
  Because “law talk” is something lawyers have in common 
regardless of which legal system they were trained in, and the large global 
law firm represents the maturation of “law talk,” this Article will focus on 
this form of cross-cultural conversation. 
 
 9. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM:  ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS, 
at xiv (2006). 
 10. See John Moles, The Cynics, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF GREEK AND ROMAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 415, 415–34 (Christopher Rowe & Malcolm Schofield eds., 2000). 
 11. See generally THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, THE COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL IN ENLIGHTENMENT 
THOUGHT:  ITS FORM AND FUNCTION IN THE IDEAS OF FRANKLIN, HUME, AND VOLTAIRE, 
1694–1790, at 7, 34 (1977) (discussing how cosmopolitan thought informed the 
Enlightenment ideal and was imported into American thought). 
 12. DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITANISM:  IDEALS AND REALITIES 15 (2010). 
 13. See id. at 69. 
 14. APPIAH, supra note 9, at 85. 
 15. Jenny Onyx et al., Scaling Up Connections:  Everyday Cosmopolitanism, 
Complexity Theory & Social Capital, 3 COSMOPOLITAN CIV. SOC’YS J. 47, 49 (2011).  
Furthermore, Ulrich Beck describes “[c]osmopolitan tolerance” as “neither defensive nor 
passive, but instead active:  it means opening oneself up to the world of the Other, perceiving 
difference as an enrichment, regarding and treating the Other as fundamentally equal.  
Expressed theoretically:  either-or logic is replaced by both-and logic.” Ulrich Beck, A New 
Cosmopolitanism Is in the Air (Nov. 2007), available at  http://www.signandsight.com/
service/1603.html (Ian Pepper trans.). 
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business, commerce, and finance looked outward and sought to capitalize 
on the beginning of a globalized world.16  This new orientation created 
interlocking trade relationships with the major trading regions of North 
America, Europe, and Asia, and helped businesses see that they could begin 
to profit from emerging forms of regulatory and tax arbitrage.17  Financial 
flows increased dramatically with twenty-four-hour markets, automated 
trading, and the rise of the investment bank as a dominant institution in 
global capital markets.  New forms of borrowing such as Eurobond and 
Eurodollar markets emerged to challenge established financial products and 
provide means of avoiding domestic taxes on corporate profits.  Ultimately, 
the social and economic philosophies of Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton 
Friedman propelled the neoliberal agenda to which a rising number of 
countries and institutions became attached.18
The effect of globalization on the legal profession is not so clear cut.  For 
example, in 1984, the International Financial Law Review (IFLR) asked:   
Who or what was an international lawyer?  The answer was overly 
technical:  “A lawyer admitted in more than one jurisdiction would have 
good reason to claim that he is an international lawyer. . . .  To the 
practitioner [international law] is advising on transactions or litigation 
involving more than one jurisdiction.”
 
19
Both views accept that there is no separate body of substantive law apart 
from the laws of those jurisdictions in which cross-border transactions, 
and so litigation, take place. . . .  [T]he first—and more traditional—view 
is that the international lawyer is really a domestic lawyer who counsels 
clients from other jurisdictions with business in his own. . . .  The second 
view is that the genuine international lawyer is not the local lawyer who 
advises foreign clients, but the lawyer—usually from the client’s own 
jurisdiction—who interprets the local lawyer’s advice and puts that advice 
in the context of the client’s multijurisdictional objectives, and the 
regulatory constraints of the client’s—and the lawyer’s—domestic 
jurisdiction.
  Furthermore, the IFLR stated that 
international law could be practiced in two ways: 
20
The IFLR editorial unrealistically asserted, as we see it now, that “[t]here is 
therefore no reason, on the face of it, why a firm wishing to become 
international . . . should open foreign offices at all, provided it has a 
network of effective correspondents in other jurisdictions.”
 
21
 
 16. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS:  POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND 
CULTURE 199–202 (1999). 
   
 17. PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 277–80 (1995). 
 18. The core elements are the rule of law, reduced states, open markets, private 
enterprise, and the primacy of property rights. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 
(1985) (arguing that the role of institutions, especially law, is crucial in economic 
development). 
 19. Editorial, Who Is the International Lawyer?, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1984, at 2, 2. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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 Since this editorial was written, the reach and spread of law firms and 
lawyers has encircled the globe and transformed the nature of legal practice 
at the transnational and international levels.  There were pioneers in this 
process, of which Baker & McKenzie was the most notable and 
distinctive.22  And though the role of law and lawyers in this development 
has often been forgotten, some scholars—for example, Yves Dezalay and 
Bryant G. Garth23—have begun to remedy this defect, while others have 
sought to criticize international lawyers.24
There is one other important aspect to the role of the lawyer, namely that 
of trusted advisor.  Charles Fried first invoked the metaphor of lawyer as 
friend in 1976 with the question, “Can a good lawyer be a good person?”
 
25  
The modern large law firm has a number of elements to balance:  it must be 
responsive on a global level, strive to offer seamless service across different 
offices and across different levels of seniority, and seek ways of 
standardizing work in order to achieve cost savings in a competitive 
environment.  Yet it must also offer an individualized service that includes 
the personal as well as the impersonal, and enables clients to request advice 
and reassurance.  The lawyer-client relationship is replete with uncertainty 
because of the nature of legal work, and managing that uncertainty is part of 
the lawyer’s skill set.26
Part of our argument is that a cosmopolitan lawyer is also a trusted 
advisor and that the two are intertwined by necessity, for one cannot exist 
without the other.  The reason for this interconnectedness is that 
globalization increases risk and uncertainty, which is, in part, a function of 
the scale of business as it grows, both domestically and internationally.  The 
global professional service provider—accountant, consultant, lawyer—must 
ameliorate this risk and give succor.  This role is crucial to the smooth 
functioning of business. 
  In this respect, a lawyer is not just a legal 
technician applying knowledge to problem areas; the lawyer assumes the 
role of trusted advisor.  This role is the hardest to describe in terms of 
discrete skills, as it requires not just legal proficiency, but also the traits that 
Fried highlighted, such as empathy, the ability to listen, and a cultural 
sensitivity to others. 
 
 22. See generally JON R. BAUMAN, PIONEERING A GLOBAL VISION:  THE STORY OF BAKER 
& MCKENZIE (1999) (describing how the firm was shaped by Russell Baker’s vision of a 
global law firm). 
 23. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS:  LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN 
STATES (2002) (discussing the role of law and lawyers in the structuring of power and the 
constitution of states). 
 24. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009) (arguing 
that global legalism is an excessive faith in the efficacy of law). 
 25. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976). 
 26. See generally John Flood, Doing Business:  The Management of Uncertainty in 
Lawyers’ Work, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (1991) (noting that the lawyer’s role is to create 
an aura around the work of the lawyer such that the client is unaware of how it is 
performed). 
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I.  METHOD AND DATA 
In this Article, we employ the rich method of oral history.  Oral history 
has a long tradition on both sides of the Atlantic.  In the United States, it 
was used to collect recordings of Native American folklore in the 
nineteenth century, and the Works Progress Administration used it to record 
accounts of survivors of the American Civil War, slavery, and life in the 
Great Depression.  Its greatest exponent was probably Studs Terkel27—a 
University of Chicago-trained lawyer—who held “Conversations with 
America.”28  In the United Kingdom, oral history has been a major method 
of studying history and social science, especially the uncovering of 
previously hidden histories.29
Our own method adopts this approach, and it is worth prefacing our 
narrative to say how it came about.  John Flood was a visiting professor at 
the University of Miami School of Law in 2008.  After presenting a paper 
on the transnational work of lawyers, Flood met Peter Lederer, who is a 
practitioner in residence at that law school.  Lederer’s career spanned the 
arc of globalization and the rise of the large law firm, from the 1960s to the 
turn of the century.  We decided that this could form the basis of a research 
project that could examine a number of phenomena, including ideas of 
career, profession, law firm life, transnationalism, legal education, and 
more.  We therefore met twice a week with a digital recorder and talked.  
Our conversations or interviews lasted around two to three hours, and we 
have supplemented them since that initial period.  Altogether we compiled 
almost thirty hours of transcribed interviews.  In addition to the interviews, 
we used documents that Lederer composed during his career, a history of 
Baker & McKenzie written by Jon Bauman in 1999,
 
30
It is relevant to inquire why the story of one person should be of interest.  
Would it not be so particular so as to have no applicability beyond its own 
limits?  Clearly we do not think so.  There is ample justification in the 
social science literature for deep, rich, and contextually based studies.
 and various public 
documents. 
31
 
 27. See generally STUDS TERKEL, AND THEY ALL SANG:  ADVENTURES OF AN ECLECTIC 
DISC JOCKEY (2005); STUDS TERKEL, DIVISION STREET:  AMERICA (1967). 
  
Flood traces his intellectual lineage through Howard Becker, Erving 
Goffman, and Everett Hughes, all trained in the Chicago School 
ethnographic approach.  Everett Hughes put it succinctly when he said 
 28. See generally Studs Terkel:  Conversations with America, CHI. HIST. MUSEUM, 
http://www.historicalvoices.org/~studs/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 29. See Graham Smith, The Making of Oral History, INST. FOR HIST. RES. § 2.2, 
http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/oral_history.html#hiddenfromhist
ory (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  The British Oral History Society has been a significant 
contributor to the making of oral histories. See ORAL HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.oralhistory.
org.uk/index.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 30. See generally BAUMAN, supra note 22.  Bauman is a former partner of Baker & 
McKenzie and is now a journalist. 
 31. See, e.g., NORMAN K. DENZIN & YVONNA S. LINCOLN, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (3d ed. 2005); CARL B. KLOCKARS, THE PROFESSIONAL FENCE 
(1974); ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH:  DESIGN AND METHODS (2d ed. 1994). 
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I am suspicious of any method said to be the one and only.  But among 
the methods I would recommend is the intensive, penetrating look with an 
imagination as lively and as sociological as it can be made.  One of my 
basic assumptions is that if one quite clearly sees something happen once, 
it is almost certain to have happened again and again.  The burden of 
proof is on those who claim a thing once seen is an exception; if they look 
hard, they may find it everywhere, although with some interesting 
differences in each case.32
The story of Peter Lederer tells us many things about being a lawyer, about 
law firms, about globalization and cosmopolitanism, about lawyer-client 
relations, about careers, and even about legal education.  The one thing that 
will become clear from the story is that none of these concepts are a finite 
thing.  Each has an evolving and emergent characteristic that is sensitive to 
context.  Indeed, we may say that this contextual sensitivity is crucial to 
succeeding in an inchoate and contingent world.  Knowing the context, the 
situation, and the framing devices is essential to accomplishing good 
lawyering, for without this embodied knowledge one would blunder 
around.
 
33
II.  A NOTE ON THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
A preliminary note on the state of the U.S. legal profession is essential to 
set the scene.  New York has always been the commercial law center of the 
United States and home to its biggest law firms.34  The formation of the 
modern big law firm occurred in the late nineteenth century, almost 
coterminous with Dean Langdell’s revision of the law school curriculum at 
Harvard.  Its architect was Paul Cravath, who developed the internal 
promotion system for associates that ensured continuing growth for law 
firms throughout the twentieth century.35  The combination of rigorous 
legal education and the “up or out” promotion system within law firms 
created a class of lawyers that was no longer entirely based on ascriptive 
values, but was based more on merit and competition within the constraints 
of the period.  Nevertheless, law firm partnerships were collegial 
institutions as reflected in their adoption of “lockstep” remuneration.36
Until the second half of the twentieth century, American law firms were 
largely parochial, and did not become engaged in international practice until 
the establishment of such enterprises as the Eurodollar and Eurobond 
 
 
 32. EVERETT C. HUGHES, THE SOCIOLOGICAL EYE:  SELECTED PAPERS ON INSTITUTIONS 
AND RACE, at ix (1971). 
 33. Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (noting 
that life is a series of performances that have to be learned and displayed in performance). 
 34. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 20–22 (1991). 
 35. See generally ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819–
1947 (1948) (explaining the evolution of the “Cravath System”). 
 36. Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession 1870—2000, in 3 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA:  THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920– ), 
at 73 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
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markets.37  They were distinct from the large U.K. law firms that, because 
of their small domestic markets, were compelled to internationalize much 
sooner.38  There were some outliers in the U.S. legal market, however,  
such as Jones Day in Cleveland, Morrison & Foerster in San Francisco, and 
Baker & McKenzie in Chicago.  Within this cadre of law firms, Baker & 
McKenzie was, in many ways, the most unusual.39
Baker & McKenzie was started with the explicit aim of being an 
international law firm.  Russell Baker, the founder, had been inspired by the 
cosmopolitanism of his professors at the University of Chicago to think of 
the world in internationalist terms.
 
40  During the 1940s, Baker realized that 
he could exploit certain American tax provisions designed to assist trade 
with Latin America.41  By arranging sales through various subsidiaries, 
U.S. companies could save tax on their profits.  Baker marketed the 
provisions to his immediate clients then promoted them through speeches 
and articles.42
Baker’s approach was different from other firms’ ways of opening 
overseas offices.  Instead of opening an office in a foreign city and staffing 
it with expatriate American lawyers, Baker decided to use local lawyers.  
As one Baker partner said:  “‘You can’t clone U.S. lawyers all around the 
world.’”
  One result was that Baker & McKenzie began its global 
spread in Latin America rather than Europe. 
43  Nevertheless, there was significant movement of partners as 
new offices were established in order to inculcate the firm’s philosophy to 
new lawyers.  For example, the China and Hong Kong offices received a 
number of lawyers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia.44  The principle was that all lawyers would be part of a single 
partnership—although Baker seemed to be primus inter pares—and that 
democracy would be the guide.  While democracy allowed partners to 
deliberate in equality, the determinants of partner compensation had to 
allow for differences in styles and types of working practices among 
lawyers.  Thus the firm adopted a remuneration formula.45
 
 37. See Carole Silver, Local Matters:  Internationalizing Strategies for U.S. Law Firms, 
14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 67, 74–77 (2007).  Much has been written on this topic and 
it would be redundant to repeat it here.  GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 
  This approach 
was different from that of most law firms in that it rejected lockstep in favor 
34, and Gordon, 
supra note 36, are the key historiographical sources for the modern U.S. legal profession. 
 38. See Silver, supra note 37, at 74–77. 
 39. See generally BAUMAN, supra note 22. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. See id. at 24–26; David L. Gibson, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations:  
Reconsidered, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 205, 205 (1967) (“Sections 921 and 922 of the 1954 
Internal Revenue Code provide for special tax advantages for domestic corporations doing 
business in Western Hemisphere countries.  However, these advantages may be 
accompanied by certain pitfalls.”).  Russell Baker became a navigator through the pitfalls 
and strenuously defended the policy against critics. See BAUMAN, supra note 22, at 24–26. 
 42. BAUMAN, supra note 22, at 32. 
 43. Id. at 44 (quoting Robert Cox). 
 44. Id. at 193–216. 
 45. Id. at 47–50. 
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of a more entrepreneurial platform that most highly rewarded individual 
effort. 
For the first two or three decades, Baker & McKenzie, despite having 
opened over twenty offices throughout the world, was sufficiently small 
that its partners could meet and make decisions fairly easily.  As the growth 
intensified, the partnership felt pressure more keenly.  Firm growth 
remained important, but deciding how and when to open new offices caused 
friction.  Some offices, such as the Australian ones in the 1980s and 1990s, 
needed to be subsidized to remain active.  The strictures of the firm’s 
renumeration formula potentially disallowed this kind of cross-subsidy.  If 
subsidies mean a diminution in partners’ compensation, then partners 
sought alternative means of expressing their displeasure.  For example, in 
Australia where adverse economic activity had forced up costs, the Sydney 
and Melbourne offices received close to a $1 million subsidy, but the 
management of those offices shifted to younger partners.46
Baker & McKenzie is a behemoth among law firms, but not among all 
professional service firms.  It started with a goal to be a global firm that 
would have collegiality at its heart.  Collegiality embraces trust, which is a 
prime constituent of a collective, based on shared principles.  As long as the 
partners could know each other, take account of others’ cultural values, and 
be part of a known entity, partnership could be articulated as a value-laden 
concept.  With the extraordinary growth of the firm, it had no choice but to 
become attached to principles of management while trying to remain 
enamored of partnership. Ultimately, a firm like Baker & McKenzie 
becomes a set of interlocking networks, virtual arms-length relationships 
tied together by strategic goals.  In sum, Baker & McKenzie started with 
two divergent aims—to be a global law firm and to be a collegial 
partnership—aims difficult to conjoin. 
 
III.  EARLY CAREER SKETCH 
Our story concerns the life of a lawyer who spent most of his career as a 
partner with Baker & McKenzie.  Peter Lederer became the seventeenth 
partner of the firm in 1959.  We start with a brief biographical sketch to set 
the scene.  He was born in Frankfurt in 1930 and grew up in Vienna.  The 
Lederer family was compelled to leave Austria and go to the United States 
after the Anschluss in 1938.  Peter attended college at the University of 
Chicago, where he graduated in two years.  He then spent a few years 
working for the United World Federalists before joining the Army.  When 
he left the Army, Peter applied to law school and entered the University of 
Chicago, which did not have a Jewish quota.47
 
 46. Id. at 99. 
  Peter became Karl 
Llewellyn’s student and then his research assistant.  Peter worked on The 
 47. See generally Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1803 (2008).  Peter had also applied to Yale, and to Indiana as a failsafe.  He 
was accepted by both Yale and Chicago, but rejected by Indiana because he did not possess a 
full four-year college degree. 
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Common Law Tradition with Llewellyn,48
After graduation, Peter became the experimental first student—or, in his 
words, a test-tube baby—for a new two-year program funded by the Ford 
Foundation to engender interest in foreign legal studies.  He learned 
German law from Max Rheinstein
 which proved to be a formative 
influence. 
49 and had courses with Soia 
Mentschikoff50 and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.51
Many companies from various countries began to use Switzerland as a 
base for establishing holding companies.  These became the building blocks 
for Peter’s networks of clients and associates.  He was establishing a 
reputation as an involved counselor.  In interviews, Peter reflected on that 
reputation and the experiences that led him to it. 
  Through Rheinstein’s 
contacts, Peter spent his second year at the University of Berne in 
Switzerland.  During this period, Baker & McKenzie asked Rheinstein for 
help locating a suitable candidate, i.e., an American lawyer trained in Swiss 
law.  A year later, Peter joined the firm.  Within two months of joining, 
Russell Baker asked Peter to open an office in Zurich.  Within four months, 
Peter was made partner and left for Zurich. 
“Here’s an interesting aspect of counseling—at least for me.  I don’t 
suppose that I can think of a situation where it was ever of great moment to 
me whether corporation X paid Y dollars more or less in taxes.  Or did or 
did not close this deal.  But what mattered to me a great deal, always and 
consistently, were the people who were involved in the transactions.  In 
terms of trying to be counselor, facilitator, navigator—that was the high 
importance I tended to place on transactions.  I suppose I didn’t care if 
[Company X] acquired the German company, but I cared that [the 
chairman] at least really understood what the seller’s problems with the 
transaction were. 
“I suppose I tended to form quite close relationships with clients—if I 
liked them.  And I had a great luxury:  if I didn’t like someone, somebody 
else in Baker & McKenzie was prepared to work with them.  I really got to 
choose the things I wanted to work on.  It’s a luxury that few possessed in 
the law firm world any time, and particularly today.  It made me place 
significant value—once I learned the term—on what it means to be a trusted 
advisor.  You gained the ability to do things for clients that you couldn’t do, 
absent knowledge and a relationship with the people you were dealing with.  
It didn’t translate into personal friendships, particularly; in fact, I pretty 
 
 48. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  DECIDING 
APPEALS (1960).  The book garnered much criticism, a significant amount of which is 
reviewed in Patrick J. Rohan, The Common Law Tradition:  Situation Sense, Subjectivism or 
“Just-Result Jurisprudence”?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 51 (1963). 
 49. See generally Guide to the Max Rheinstein Papers 1869-1977, UNIV. CHI. LIB., 
http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/scrc/findingaids/view.php?eadid=ICU.SPCL.RHEINSTEIN 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 50. See generally Soia Mentschikoff, UNIV. MIAMI SCH. L., http://www.law.miami.edu/
library/soia.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 51. Mr. Katzenbach recently published a memoir about his government service. See 
NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, SOME OF IT WAS FUN:  WORKING WITH RFK AND LBJ (2008). 
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studiously avoided much in the way of social exchange.  My standard was 
very simple; I didn’t spend any social time with people if I wouldn’t have 
wanted to do so absent the client relationship.”52
After five years in the Zurich office, Peter turned down a suggestion to 
head up the Tokyo office and chose New York as his future base.  Around 
this time, Peter also was appointed to the firm’s Executive Committee and 
thereafter became involved in managing the firm. 
 
IV.  CASE STUDIES 
In this section, we focus on the central case studies of this paper.  They 
involve the intensive roles of counselor and trusted advisor that were 
alluded to above.  What is interesting about the cases is that, unlike much of 
modern lawyering, they were not so much about document assemblage—
though documents play an important role—but about the construction of 
institutions that were to have their own independent existence.  Since the 
creation of institutions revolves around finding ways to bring similar 
interests together to pursue common purposes, the arts of persuasion, 
analysis, and even rhetoric are crucial to delivering success.  The two case 
studies concern the U.S. nuclear power industry’s establishment of a self-
funding insurance scheme, and the merger of Deloitte with Touche Ross 
into one of the biggest accounting firms in the world. 
At this period, globalization was still in its infancy.  The two case studies 
concern both domestic law and global aspects.  Although the nuclear 
industry case study appears domestic, it contains aspects that show its 
global features.  It is based on the work Peter undertook in Zurich, and the 
work done in that case study led to the second case study.  Thus, there is a 
direct link that crosses geographical and legal boundaries.  For example, 
Peter’s use of the Swiss Verein structure to join the two accounting firms 
was one of its first uses in professional services outside of a civil law 
jurisdiction.  In effect, it was a legal transplant.53
The prequel to our cases occurs in the late 1960s.  When the Boeing 747 
was introduced, airlines found their insurance premiums skyrocketing.  A 
number of airlines from around the world started discussing the idea of 
setting up their own insurance company to self-insure.  Peter, shortly after 
returning to New York, became counsel to the project.  He worked on it 
intensively over the next two years, becoming knowledgeable about the 
  Moreover, in both cases, 
much of the thought behind the documentation derived from Peter’s 
experience with companies in Zurich seeking solutions to unusual 
circumstances. 
 
 52. The interviews we cite were conducted between February and April 2008 with 
supplementary interviews in September 2011.  There have been many unrecorded 
discussions between the authors since the initial interviews, which have been used to amplify 
or interpret parts of the narrative.  These statements, verified by the authors, have been 
lightly edited by the Fordham Law Review. 
 53. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS:  AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993) (discussing how legal transplants develop law through 
their interaction with host systems). 
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insurance world:  “It was something so new.  The airline captive was really 
one of the first industry insurance operations that was ever contemplated.  
There was no book on it.”  Although the insurance company never fully 
materialized, Peter, as a result of his work for the airlines, was asked to be 
counsel to a nuclear facility insurance project as a result. 
A.  Nuclear Power Self-Insurance 
The Edison Electric Institute had asked a committee to review problems 
with nuclear property insurance.  Harry Poth, a well-known New York 
utility lawyer and a friend of one of Peter’s partners, was asked to serve on 
that committee.  Peter explains how he came to be involved: 
The Edison Electric Institute “felt [the nuclear property insurance] to be 
indecently expensive for something they viewed as having zero risk of loss.  
I won’t editorialize on that.  They were at the point where they wanted to 
really explore this in depth, and they were trying to figure out whom they 
might find as counsel for the project.  Harry Poth54
“That then led to my going to work, in 1970, with a group of about a 
dozen utilities that were exploring the feasibility of setting up an industry-
owned insurance company.  The goal was to serve those utilities that either 
had or were about to have nuclear power stations.  The feasibility study 
stage of this was undertaken by Ebasco Services Limited, a consulting 
spinoff from the old Electric Bond and Share Company.  It was a group of 
technical people from almost every field you could think of who were very 
well connected to the utilities.  I did a few weeks’ worth of work—some 
suggestions as to corporate structure, situs, and issues of insurance law that 
would need to be dealt with.  Ebasco explored the economic feasibility of 
setting up such a company, in little more depth than saying it can be done 
and that we can do it.  They presented this report to the utilities. 
 remembered that the 
aviation industry had looked at something very similar, and the general 
counsel of the Air Transport Association of America was an old friend of 
his.  So he called him up and asked, ‘You guys went through something like 
this, whom would you use as counsel?’  He got the answer, ‘[i]f you want 
somebody who really understands insurance inside and out, I’d go to Lord, 
Day & Lord.  On the other hand,’ he said, ‘we used Baker, and while they 
had to do a lot of learning about insurance, they really got into it, and they 
carried through and did a bang up job for us.’  Harry said ‘Thanks,’ and 
went to Lord, Day & Lord.  To my everlasting gratitude, about two weeks 
into it, Lord, Day & Lord discovered they had a conflict.  They told Harry 
they were sorry, they couldn’t do it. 
“The project had been heavily pushed by J. Harris Ward,55 the chairman 
of Commonwealth Edison in Chicago; he had assigned his general counsel, 
a man named Hubert Nexon,56
 
 54. Mr. Poth was a partner at Reid & Priest in New York. 
 to the project.  Ward and the others who 
received the report didn’t much like Ebasco’s fairly summary conclusions, 
 55. See, e.g., Personalities, TIME, Feb. 21, 1964, at 86. 
 56. See Kenan Heise, Ex-Edison Executive H.H. Nexon, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 1990, at 13. 
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and decided to call a meeting of potentially interested utilities in Chicago 
for further discussion.  I was invited to the meeting, and was surprised to 
find when I arrived that I was the only ‘outsider’; they had not invited 
Ebasco or anyone else that had worked on the study.  This was a strange 
situation.  The meeting was out at O’Hare, and lasted about six hours.  
There had to be thirty-five or forty utility representatives present.57
“They decided to set up a six- or seven-person steering committee headed 
by Hubert Nexon and asked me to serve as counsel to the group.  I was 
enormously pleased—and more than a little surprised—at the way things 
had developed.  Ebasco, of course, was bent out [of] shape beyond all 
belief.  They had viewed themselves as ‘owning’ the project. 
  There 
was lengthy discussion and they decided they would restart and do their 
own feasibility project. 
“With that started a really intense two-year project, at the end of which 
we wrote our first insurance policy:  it was for $100 million of coverage, 
with resources of $14 million cash in hand and the promise of the thirteen 
members to put up fourteen times one year’s premium, if required by 
losses.  It was called Nuclear Mutual Limited, or NML.  In 1980, a second 
company called Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) was set up, 
which covered broader risks.  Some years ago, NML was liquidated into its 
younger sister company, and today NEIL insures every nuclear property 
risk in the United States and a number around the world.  It has a surplus of 
nearly $5 billion.  It has been one of the single most successful things ever 
done in that field.” 
Although the work began as a domestic project, it was based in work 
done outside the United States to assist companies operating in foreign 
jurisdictions.  While much of the work involved in the project was strategic 
planning, the legal aspect had a life of its own, and derived from Peter’s 
work drafting the articles for the airline captive.  Peter demonstrates how 
this occurred. 
“I mentioned earlier that I was retained to work for the airlines to set up a 
captive insurance company.  When it came time to draft articles to be used 
for [an airline captive insurance company], I was up in Connecticut working 
on it at my weekend place.  I didn’t have access to the library.  But I had up 
there copies of Swiss materials I had worked on.  One of them was a set of 
articles I had drafted for a joint venture.  So I took those articles, and 
adapted them to what I thought was going to be needed for the airline 
company.  While we formed the company, and it still exists today in 
Bermuda, we never used those articles.  But then a couple of years later, 
time came to form the [nuclear] utility-owned insurance company.  Again, I 
needed a set of articles.  Since I had fine-tuned the airlines’ articles for a 
group captive, and thought through some of the issues of a multi-party 
ownership situation, I pulled those out and fiddled with them some more, 
 
 57. In an aside, Peter remarked that “[a]n interesting minor sociological fact was that I 
was the only person in the room wearing a blue shirt; everybody else had a white shirt on.  
And no women.  That was the utilities of the ’70s.” 
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and then used those as the articles of incorporation pursuant to which 
Nuclear Mutual Limited was incorporated in Bermuda.” 
The legal aspect also became independent of its creator, as Peter 
discovered:  “The company was set up, but hadn’t yet started writing 
insurance policies—because we hadn’t yet reached the critical mass that 
had been agreed as the starting point. . . .  [T]he Ebasco Consulting people 
had had their noses very much out of joint about not being selected to work 
on this.  So they decided to set up a competing vehicle of their own, and 
offer that to the utilities as an alternative to what had been done by our 
group.  In due course, the chap who had first gotten me involved in all this, 
Harry Poth of Reid & Priest, turned up acting as counsel for [Ebasco’s 
project].  Somebody sent me a copy of their offering circular, which 
included the articles of incorporation for their captive.  I started reading 
through that and I said ‘Christ, this looks familiar.’  They had lifted huge 
pieces, just verbatim.  Their venture went nowhere, and Nuclear Mutual 
Limited proceeded very successfully.  With Nuclear Mutual Limited, 
Bermuda started the first of what became a huge and very successful 
business of industry-owned insurance companies.  It put itself on the map 
for large captives, and that really was the birth of the insurance industry as 
it exists today.” 
Moreover, this type of “legal technology” endures:  “There was a third, 
Oil Insurance Limited, a venture of the large oil companies.  I was also 
briefly the counsel for that, but got conflicted out when they fired their 
CEO since I had acted for him.  There are, today, literally hundreds and 
hundreds of such insurance companies in Bermuda.  The funny thing is, I 
can still pick up sets of articles and find some wording which traces back to 
those old Swiss articles.” 
It is a function of cosmopolitanism that the borrowing and transplanting 
of legal concepts was not the problem it appeared to be for comparative 
lawyers.  Being comfortable in more than one jurisdiction made the transfer 
seamless; it was a means of finding solutions to complex problems.  Indeed, 
this early work enabled the enterprise to become international in its later 
life. 
One of the crucial parts of the NML operation was to find a base for it in 
a jurisdiction that would not impose overly burdensome regulatory 
obstacles.  Peter and his colleagues evaluated many domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions and then settled on Bermuda.  During this phase, Peter was an 
integral part of the enterprise, somewhat more than its counsel; the NML 
board relied on his judgment. 
“It was a combination of factors.  One of the reasons we picked Bermuda 
was not sophisticated insurance regulation, it was a lack of insurance 
regulation.  It was an unregulated industry.  There were some laws on the 
books about insurance, but they didn’t apply to things of this size and 
scope.  Basically, we picked it because of a lack of regulation, a lack of 
taxation, it being an English language jurisdiction, decent communications, 
and a decent level of competence among legal professionals and bankers.  
And the top accounting firms were well established there.  They seemed 
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more stable and more familiar than the islands in the Caribbean.  Again, 
though, the critical point was really the lack of a formal system of insurance 
regulation. 
“I suppose from 1969 to the mid-70s, we probably used Bermuda for 
twenty-five to thirty clients of ours.  Part of it is simply the efficiency 
aspect.  You’ve done one, then you’ve done two.  By the time you have 
done three or four, you really know the ins and outs of how to deal there.  
You’ve built up working relationships with the legal community, the 
bankers, the accountants, and the government.  Then comes the most 
powerful of all things—corporate fashion:  ‘What, you don’t have a 
Bermuda captive?  Don’t talk to me on the golf course.’  That led to some 
gnashing of teeth in some other places.  From Colorado to Hawaii, then 
later Indiana and Vermont, all of these states wanted to be known as the 
place to set up an insurance operation.  Over time, a number of them were 
more or less successful in attracting companies that, for one reason or 
another, found it useful to be physically proximate to wherever their 
insureds were located.  And a change in the tax law in the early 80s gave a 
shot in the arm to a number of the U.S. locations.”58
Insuring nuclear power stations was considered a typical low risk–high 
impact situation until the Three Mile Island disaster occurred.
 
59  The 
disaster brought in other utilities, which had originally stayed outside the 
new insurance structure:  “We continued as General Counsel for NML, and 
were retained to work on the question of setting up a program to provide 
business interruption insurance.  It was not clear initially whether that 
should be a separate program or insurance policy offered by NML, or 
whether a new company should be formed.  Ultimately, we decided for a 
range of reasons—one being that there was still residual tension between 
the non-NML utilities and the NML utilities—we decided to do it as a 
separate company.  That was formed and was called Nuclear Electric 
Insurance Limited, or NEIL60
 
 58. It probably goes without saying that taxation is one of the key variables in how 
transactions are structured and also where they are situated.  Tax questions often drive global 
or international solutions to difficult domestic legal problems. See generally DOREEN 
MCBARNET & CHRISTOPHER WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING AND THE CROSS-EYED 
JAVELIN THROWER (1999) (discussing how legal devices are developed by professionals in 
transactions). 
 for short.  Then came a further development.  
Once NEIL existed, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said to the nuclear 
utilities, ‘As a condition of your license, you have to show that you are 
financially secure to operate a nuclear plant, and financially secure means 
purchasing all the insurance that is commercially available.’  Thus you had, 
in effect, a regulatory command to all utilities to join NEIL.  The resources 
needed were simply too large to be available from the pools at that time.  
 59. See Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. 
COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012). See generally CHESTER A. ZAGASKI, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
AND INSURANCE (1992). 
 60. See NUCLEAR ELECTRIC INS. LIMITED, http://www.nmlneil.com/members/default.
aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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The same approach—promises to pay at least X times one year’s premium 
which had worked, by good fortune, successfully for NML—that was the 
way that NEIL started business.” 
Being counsel to both NML and NEIL had benefits for both Peter and the 
law firm.  It enabled him to bring the client and firm together in a strong 
relationship that benefited the firm’s younger lawyers:  “One obvious 
aspect, it was a wonderful training ground for good young lawyers whom I 
could get involved in this work.  For a while at least, it was a fulltime 
involvement simply because the scope of the work was so large.  What it 
brought to us for the first time—remember, I told you that what set Baker 
apart from other firms, besides its size, is that we tended not to be general 
counsel.  Here was a very large enterprise where we were general counsel, 
and whether it was dispute resolution or insurance questions, securities law 
questions, regulatory questions, antitrust questions, the full range of issues 
came up in the context of the two companies.  Including, what turned out to 
be more threatening than any nuclear accident looming, a tax case.”61
After Peter retired from Baker & McKenzie, he joined the NML/NEIL 
board.  Peter had also attempted to persuade the company to move into the 
“export” market and go global, but it had to handle the parochialism of 
American industry as well as distrust from foreigners.  During this period, 
globalization did not exist in the form that we now understand it.  In the 
nuclear utilities industry, there was often deep suspicion of foreigners on 
both sides of the ocean. 
 
“I thought it was a wonderful export product.  Not long after NML 
started, I had the visit in New York of a Mr. Van Gulck, the insurance 
manager of Electrobel, a large electric utility in Belgium that has a nuclear 
power station.  He wanted to know if they could join NML.  He had heard 
about it and thought it was a nifty thing to do.  I told him that I sensed the 
mood of the people was much too parochial to think of it as a 
possibility . . . I said, ‘Look, just in bringing them together for NML we had 
to convince Duke Power Company that Con Edison in New York did not 
leave dirty, oily rags lying around.’  They were suspicious of each other, 
and I said the idea of insuring your risk, outside the United States—not only 
is it foreign (and these are people who have no foreign businesses, which is 
truly important)—but you are not regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and they really believe that measure of regulation is what 
keeps them on their toes.  Possibly, were you to set up a European mutual 
along the lines of what NML has done, then perhaps we could work out 
mutual reinsurance arrangements or some sort of collaboration. 
“And Mr. Van Gulck set out to do just that.  That resulted in the 
formation of a Belgian company called EMANI (European Mutual 
Association for Nuclear Insurance).62
 
 61. The tax case was eventually settled for $30 million on a $600 million claim. 
  It never quite did very much.  I had 
been convinced at the beginning, convinced years later, and am convinced 
 62. See EMANI, http://www.emani.be/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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still today, that there are so few of these risks in the world that the sensible 
thing to do would be bring all of it together to share the risks.  The basic 
concept is this:  for risks such as these, the world’s commercial insurance 
markets are not going to use profitability from insuring bicycles or 
automobiles (or wherever they make their money) to underwrite losses in 
the nuclear insurance industry—or any number of other specialized 
industries.  What the insurers provide essentially, other than know-how and 
rating—which you can either build or buy—is financing.  There is cheaper 
financing to be had than by buying insurance.  I have given papers on this, I 
have written on it, I have preached it—but I haven’t quite converted the 
world. 
“My views as to proselytizing were shared by one of the executives from 
Marsh & McLennan who was the account executive from Marsh on 
NML/NEIL, Alonzo Rand.  He had started as a nuclear engineer on the 
Manhattan Project under Stagg Field in World War II, and went to work in 
the insurance field as a nuclear engineer.  Al and I were convinced that the 
message had to be preached.  We decided to approach the utilities around 
the world to see if they were interested in at least coming together to 
discuss this.  We got permission from our respective masters that this was 
not an unwanted or undesirable thing to do.  We wrote to the nuclear 
utilities in Korea, Japan, Canada, throughout Europe, the United Kingdom, 
and South Africa and asked, would you come together on a given date?  
The Central Electricity Generating Board was kind enough to say they 
would host it at their offices in London, and we put on a three-day seminar 
for interested utilities.  In the event, it was only the people from Continental 
Europe who showed up, plus the U.K. utilities, plus a Finnish utility, and 
the South Africans.  We did a good three-day seminar.  The long and the 
short of it was this:  everybody was very interested, thought it was a great 
idea, but nobody was prepared to really get behind it and push.  EMANI, in 
the meantime, was limping along, slowly gathering members.  What they 
had done was to ride piggy-back on the European pools’ insurance policies.  
You do everything, you issue the policy, but we will only write two percent 
of the risk.  It was so small, actually, as to be meaningless.  They were not 
prepared to commit either present capital or in the form of promises.  
Without that they were going nowhere. 
“NEIL then having, in due course, conquered the U.S.—the commercial 
insurance pool still exists but it is virtually irrelevant by now—with much 
nudging on my part then took a look at a couple of European risks, and 
several utility prospects seemed to be interested.  After a great deal of 
gentle persuasion, the board kind of reluctantly said, ‘You can talk to the 
people in Spain who are particularly interested.’  And there was some 
interest shown by the Swiss utilities—I had generated a part of it because I 
was involved with them in Switzerland.  It was decided to set up a 
subsidiary of NEIL in Europe and put somebody over on its staff to work 
the European market.  That was set up in Dublin, and since people are cute, 
it was named O’NEIL for Overseas Nuclear Electric Insurance Ltd. 
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“The end result was that NEIL got a new member, Electrabel.63
Clearly parts of corporate America were slow to capitalize on the growth 
of globalization occurring during this period, but few of the global 
institutions that ease the path of commerce, such as the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, existed at this time, so the approach to risk 
management was cautious and slow.  Cosmopolitans such as Peter were a 
rarity and were only beginning to flex their comparative and international 
muscles.  Every aspect of globalization had to be built from the ground up.  
The result was that institutional failure was as much a part of the process as 
success.  In the case of nuclear power insurance, it was not a global success 
despite the regard, as advisor, in which the industry held Peter.  The role of 
lawyers like Peter was to create the circumstances that would encourage 
different groups to entertain the realistic idea of working together.  It was to 
create and foster a community of interests.  It was slow and painstaking 
work that did not always reach its goal. 
  
Electrabel had been purchased by Suez, and was a bit more international-
minded than they had been in the past.  We had our first non-U.S. utility 
and first European board member.” 
B.  The Accounting Business 
The second case study involves the accounting business.  Overlapping 
with the work on the nuclear industry, which involved attempting to bring 
together disparate groups in a common enterprise, Peter began to work for a 
number of international accounting firms on organizational and structural 
matters.  He worked on setting up a new structure for Grant Thornton,64 
then a Chicago-based accounting firm that had decided to go global.  That 
led to a colleague from the former airline captive insurance project asking 
Peter to talk to the general counsel of Touche Ross.65
“He was wrestling with what to do with Touche Ross International 
which, when first encountered, was simply an agreement amongst the 
international firms.  It was not a very good one, and it was coupled with a 
name-holding partnership that they had set up in the Bahamas—as to which 
nobody seemed to know exactly how it might work or what it did.  So after 
a good deal of work, that led, for the first time, to the idea of exploring a 
Swiss Verein as the vehicle.” 
 
Again we see the resurgence of Peter’s Swiss roots as a lawyer in his 
selection of this particular vehicle to solve Touche Ross’s international 
partnership problems.  At this time, Touche Ross was an amalgamation of 
 
 63. See About Us, ELECTRABEL, http://www.electrabel.com/whoarewe/whoarewe.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 64. See History of Grant Thornton LLP, GRANT THORNTON, 
http://www.grantthornton.com/ (follow “About us” hyperlink; then follow “History of Grant 
Thornton” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 65. See Family Tree, ICAEW, http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-gateways/
accounting-history/resources/whats-in-a-name/touche-ross (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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fifty U.S. firms and firms from fifty-five other countries.66
“An interesting aspect of the Verein is that it had been used for limited 
commercial purposes.  A Verein under Swiss law is not permitted to engage 
in a commercial activity, but the Swiss Supreme Court had held, in the 
‘Cigarette Cartel’ case,
  Given this level 
of complexity, it is unlikely that a purely U.S.-trained lawyer would have 
arrived at an equivalent solution, not having experienced overseas work. 
67
At this stage, Peter’s reputation as an institution creator and 
troubleshooter had grown extensively.  Companies and professional service 
firms with complex and complicated international structures that were no 
longer sufficient for modern global commercial demands were desperate to 
find ways to restructure themselves that would fit with more convergent and 
coherent ways of doing business.  In the period from the 1960s to around 
1980, gross world product and foreign domestic investment flows doubled 
in size.
 that even though the Verein’s members had a 
commercial activity, they could use the form of the Verein to come together 
to govern the relations amongst themselves.  That was not to be considered 
commercial activity.  Second, of importance to Touche Ross, and ultimately 
to a number of other firms that were considering similar structures, a Verein 
could be a coming together of entities.  It did not need to have individual 
members of the Verein, but firms could be the Verein’s members.  Indeed, 
individuals could not be members of the Verein.  Third, it was a democratic 
form of institution, with governing bodies that you could pretty much tailor 
to your taste.  Finally, though really never tested, the liability of members 
of the Verein, for claims against the Verein itself, was limited to the amount 
of their contributions to the Verein.  It thus provided an extremely 
interesting legal form, at least one major bulwark against vicarious liability.  
So using a Verein was ultimately agreed to, we worked on it, we set it up.  
Then, Ernst & Ernst retained me to work on their coming together with 
Whinney Murray—this is now taking me from the 1970s to the early 80s.” 
68  More countries were becoming involved in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, there was more openness, and exports rose 
dramatically.69
For Peter, this was an exciting era and he was becoming an industry 
specialist.  His reputation, allied with the growth of Baker & McKenzie into 
the world’s largest law firm, gave him a solid base.  Both Touche Ross and 
Ernst & Ernst, as well as KPMG (another of Peter’s clients), became 
members of the Big Four accounting world group.   
 
“I did get known as the lawyer who understood how accounting firms 
work.  Ernst & Ernst was, at first, concerned that anything I did for them 
should be proprietary.  They didn’t want all this valuable information 
shared with any of their other seven, as it then was, competitors.  I said I 
 
 66. See History, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GX/global/about/
overview/history/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 67. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Feb. 11, 1936, 62 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 32 (Switz.). 
 68. HELD ET AL., supra note 16, at 242 tbl.5.1. 
 69. Id. at 164–65, 169. 
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couldn’t do that.  That, obviously, they benefited from the work I had done 
with other firms.  I certainly accepted the obligation not to tell anything 
about their internal business affairs to anybody else, but the concepts 
couldn’t be proprietary.  Interestingly enough, not only did they buy that, 
but in not one of the relationships I had with any of the accounting firms 
was there any significant objection to the fact that I had acted for everybody 
else.” 
Peter’s role as a senior partner involved in management at Baker & 
McKenzie helped because of the similarities between the law firm and the 
accounting clients.  The ethos of the professional services firm was not too 
dissimilar across disciplinary boundaries.  Their structures shared common 
problems and, since both Baker & McKenzie and the big accounting firms 
were global institutions, Peter’s experience was invaluable.  If he had been 
a U.S. law firm partner, he would not have been able to appreciate the 
cross-border difficulties that arose in his work.  It is in this kind of work 
that the synergy between Peter the Individual, and Peter the Partner at 
Baker & McKenzie is actively demonstrated. 
“At the start of this work [with the accounting firms] I was on my second 
tour serving on the Baker & McKenzie Executive Committee.  So that was 
a level of Baker & McKenzie management I think they felt I had seen 
intimately enough to know what the issues were and how they were dealt 
with.  There was also the fact that in dealing with the international 
governing bodies of the accounting firms, as I tended to do as these projects 
went forward, these people knew their counterparts in the Baker & 
McKenzie offices—in Mexico or Italy or in New York.  They might often 
compete with us, incidentally, because . . . KPMG competed sharply with 
law firms, but at least they knew my people.  That was unquestionably a 
plus as well.  I could, for example, say—if there were something under 
Italian law the representative of the Italian firm worried about, in terms of 
participating in a recommended structure—I could tell him to go talk it over 
with Alberto DeLibero, the senior partner of the Milan office.  He was 
highly regarded as an objective sort of guy.  That was very helpful, 
obviously.  The counterpart of it, in terms of difficulty, was that there was 
occasional unhappiness on the part of some of my partners in the firm—
having a special relationship for a period of time, let’s say with Ernst & 
Ernst, when they were trying to foster something with Arthur Andersen.70
I worked on Ernst & Ernst’s merger with Whinney Murray [in 1979].  
Then came KPMG.  They had a general counsel in the United States, Victor 
Earl.  I forget how I met Vic; I had met him a couple of times and we sort 
of bristled at each other—I can’t even remember why.  I got a call from him 
though, and he asked if I could come over to talk to him.  The story he told 
me was that they had expanded very rapidly in terms of offices in Latin 
America.  There were difficulties in building up his in-house legal staff with 
 
 
 70. The role of conflicts of interest in law firm development has been one of the prime 
reasons for the establishment of the law firm general counsel. See generally Elizabeth 
Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1515 
(2006). 
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rapidity, and he asked if I would act as general counsel for his Latin 
American group of offices with any legal issues, questions, and problems 
they had.  I think he had seen my work product somewhere and liked it.  It 
was a nice offer, and we talked it through and I thought it over and accepted 
it.  Regretfully, in terms of work, within the year, they had decided to 
merge with Peat Marwick so that was the end of that engagement.  Then I 
was consulted around the fringes of Arthur Andersen’s restructuring.” 
In 1989, the accounting mergers, well in advance of law firm mergers, 
began in earnest.71
“Then the Deloitte
  Peter had now acted for four of the largest accounting 
firms in the world and was regarded as the industry restructuring expert 
who understood global mergers. 
72 thing really started when I had a call from Touche 
Ross’s general counsel, Rick Murray,73
As is often the case with complex matters of this sort, little was 
straightforward:  “So, I got that all set up—and very little happened.  The 
Frankfurt office got a call on something, the Mexico City office got a call 
on something, but two or three months went by with quite a low level of 
activity.  Then I got a call again from Rick Murray, who apologized.  He 
said that he had been zipping all around the world.  He had come to realize 
that the problem was really to figure out how to bring the two international 
organizations together, and that obviously, since he was the counsel for one 
party, he himself could not fulfill that role very well.  He wondered whether 
I would undertake the job of serving as counsel to both sides on the legal 
issues of putting themselves together.  I said I didn’t know.  I knew Rick 
and I knew Tom Presby (who had introduced us),
 saying that while it was still totally 
confidential, it looked to be the case that Touche and Deloitte were in very 
serious merger talks.  He asked whether I would act as counsel/resource to 
the Touche Ross member firms around the world in addressing the legal 
issues they had in coming together with Deloitte.  That led to my 
communicating with all the firm’s offices asking each of them to designate 
a contact partner whose name could be made available to the local Touche 
Ross firm.  I asked them to hold themselves available, and be sure to keep 
me informed of what transpired—if anything.  I told them I would do 
centralized billing and told them what I knew of some of the issues going 
on and outlined the proposed structure and deal.” 
74
 
 71. See generally Mun Soo Choi & Daniel Zéghal, The Effect of Accounting Firm 
Mergers on International Markets for Accounting Services, 8 J. INT’L ACCT. AUDITING & 
TAX’N 1 (1999). 
 but I did not know the 
head of Touche Ross.  And as far as Deloitte was concerned, I didn’t know 
their people at all.  I told him that before saying yea or nay, I would like to 
meet them.  He said that was totally reasonable, and that he would set up an 
 72. See About Deloitte, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/About/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 73. See Richard Murray, REPUTABILITY, http://www.reputability.co.uk/section.php/61/1/
richard_murray (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 74. See J. Thomas Presby, FORBES, http://people.forbes.com/profile/j-thomas-presby/
4628 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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appointment for me to meet with Ed Kangas75 and Mike Cook,76 the 
respective managing partners of Touche and Deloitte.  He told me I should 
also meet a man named Bob Buesser,77
“I arranged to go over to their offices one morning.  Rick took me into a 
meeting that was in progress, where Ed Kangas and Bob Buesser were 
present.  Mike Cook, I was told, intended to come, but wasn’t quite sure if 
he could make it.  But why didn’t we start?  So the three of them and I sat 
around for an hour or so, discussing in broad outline what was involved in 
bringing two international firms under one roof—and where that roof might 
be.  After an hour or so I noticed, subliminally, that Rick Murray had 
walked out, and that was the last we saw of him at the meeting.  Somewhere 
around five that afternoon I was still sitting there, and we were still talking 
about the mechanics of how you do this, and what the issues were, and Ed 
Kangas—as we were about to adjourn for the day—asked, ‘You’re going to 
work on this?’  I said, ‘I guess I am.’  There had been excellent rapport and 
the fullest of conversations. 
 who was intended to be the Chief 
Operating Officer of the combined firms. 
“With that started an intense period of work over a couple of years.  The 
two dominant firms—Touche Ross United States and Deloitte, Plender, 
Haskins & Sells United States—had agreed that they wanted to merge.  
Both had the support, with some variations of enthusiasm, of their other top 
three or four member firms around the world.  Those basically tended to be 
the Anglo firms—Canada, Australia, U.K.—with, I think it probably fair to 
say, less enthusiasm on the part of the rest of the world.  I think that was 
really for two reasons.  In the accounting profession, the Anglo-American 
firms historically had been the dominant ones for well over a century, and 
they felt a natural affinity:  their training was similar, their roots were all in 
Scotland somewhere, and they came most easily to the view that they would 
do well by having a closer union if they got together.  But a large number of 
issues needed to be resolved.  In each country, you had the task of putting 
together two firms that had different styles and different cultures.  Touche 
was probably in some ways, in many places, looked upon as a younger and 
brasher firm than was Deloitte—that was an older and more settled firm.  
Whether that comported with reality is a different issue, but at least that was 
the perception.  Or, in a given jurisdiction, one firm might view itself as 
more powerful, more successful, the better firm.  There ensued a series of 
negotiations, literally around the world, in terms of people trying to decide:  
would they or would they not be willing to get married.  As the head of one 
firm said to me, ‘You know, the situation we face is that it is an arranged 
 
 75. See Edward A. Kangas, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/About/
History/Leaders-Shapers/74e15264b03fb110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 76. See J. Michael Cook, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/About/
History/Leaders-Shapers/58dfad9fed2fb110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 77. See HASKINS & SELLS/DELOITTE, PLENDER, HASKINS & SELLS, NEW PARTNERS AND 
PRINCIPALS 4, 6 (1969), available at http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm4/document.php?
CISOROOT=/deloitte&CISOPTR=49427&REC=5. 
2012] BECOMING A COSMOPOLITAN LAWYER 2535 
marriage.  The parents on both sides think it is a wonderful thing, but we’ve 
never met the girl.’ 
“The legal job was multipart and interesting.  One key issue was where, 
and how, are we going to put the structure together.  As I told you before, it 
wasn’t an automatic assumption; we went back and looked to see what 
alternatives were available, what other international firms were doing, had 
there been any changes in the law anywhere that made country A or B 
better or worse.  We did wind up once again saying that we thought that a 
Swiss Verein was the best solution.  One significant aspect of the choice 
was that the Touche side had worked happily for ten years with that 
structure.  That sharply reduced the sales job, plus it gave the Deloitte 
people somebody to talk to.  ‘So how does that work for you?’  Answers 
independent of what the lawyers had to say about it.  So that was number 
one. 
“A second was also interesting; there were antitrust issues that came up 
sharply, in the United States and in the EU.  In the United States, that was 
handled by Skadden Arps, who was acting for the two firms on the U.S. 
merger issues—they also needed SEC approval for everything.  By then the 
number of accounting firms was really starting to shrink and there were 
serious concerns.  We handled the EU part of the antitrust issues.  A very 
good antitrust expert in Baker’s London office, Linda Martin,78
“I was doing two primary things:  one was staying on top of coordinating 
the whole range of work that was being done.  Then, on a handful of 
occasions, I was trying to use my good offices—firms were bumping into 
intractable issues in bringing themselves together.  There were perhaps four 
or five partners from either Touche or Deloitte’s international operation 
offices (both firms had large international structures before the merger) and 
the best people were taken from each of the two groups to be the 
troubleshooters around the world.  I joined that group and went off to try to 
help facilitate the marriage of the two German firms that didn’t want to 
marry, and there were also the Turkish firms that didn’t want to.  Turkey in 
particular was interesting.  The first Iraq War had just started.  You could 
fly from New York to Turkey on the Turkish airline—but I didn’t want to.  
So I flew on Swissair to Zurich and from Zurich down to Istanbul.  Swissair 
at the time still flew 747s—but people were nervous and there were only 
twelve passengers on the plane! 
 worked on 
coordinating that; she worked closely with the U.K. Deloitte and Touche 
firms, did the Brussels part of it with some people out of our Brussels 
office, and got a satisfactory solution.  Not easy to get, but got it done 
within a decent time. 
“The next day, Saturday, we met in the Touche offices and we started 
early.  We reached an agreement—except three months later the agreement 
had come apart.  So I met with them again, they flew to Brussels where I 
met with them, but they could never get together. 
 
 78. See Linda Martin Alegi Biography, ABA, http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-
bios/alegi-lynda.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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“While all of this is going on, we get the Verein formed.  I have in the 
meantime assembled a home court team in New York, basically one 
younger partner and two associates.  We start doing the documentation, and 
prepare something along the lines of an offering circular that we can send 
around the world.  We get it blessed by the various people that need to bless 
it and send it out.  Then there started feeding in—at first kind of a trickle 
and then a very steady stream—of ‘I’ve got questions about this or . . . I’ve 
got questions about that.’  In a number of cases, we got the people from a 
local [Baker] office involved—to speak the same language as the question 
askers.  We started the formation process in Switzerland, and then began the 
sign-up process.  The two major firms had agreed they would announce the 
Verein’s existence when we reached critical mass of a given number of 
firms having signed on to it.  In the space of about a year, we were off and 
on our way. 
“There was an international Executive Committee established for the 
Verein.  That committee consisted initially of some twelve or thirteen 
people; the heads of seven or eight of the largest firms, and then a scattering 
for either geographical representation or small firm participation.  And here 
again, I started meeting with that Executive Committee.  I did not do this 
for as long as I had in NEIL’s case; I did it for probably the first two years 
of the group’s existence—by that time, the issues had been pretty well 
ironed out.  But by that time I had told Ed Kangas . . . I started thinking 
about how much time I was spending on this . . . it was a hugely absorbing 
thing, I was then in my early sixties, and I was still extremely heavily 
involved with NML and NEIL, and I decided I really needed to try to 
simplify existence a little bit.” 
As the Deloitte-Touche merger came to fruition, Peter found himself 
being asked to undertake the strategy work for the new combined firm.79
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
The result was that Peter formally resigned from Baker & McKenzie and 
became Of Counsel, but continued to work on strategy for them, NEIL, and 
Deloitte & Touche.  By this time, Peter had become the focal point of the 
restructuring work of the various companies and firms.  Not only was his 
role to formulate the structures, but it extended into ensuring they survived 
and became established so they could take on their own independent 
existences. 
In this Article, we have tried to demonstrate how cosmopolitanism and 
globalization are connected through the medium of a lawyer’s practice.  Our 
particular emic approach has permitted us to view a lawyer’s work, client 
relationships, and law firm participation through the use of thick 
 
 79. One of Peter’s last tasks at the firm was to chair the Nominating Committee that 
sought potential members of the firm’s governing committees.  He was instrumental in 
persuading a young female partner in the Paris office to join the Executive Committee.  That 
young partner was Christine Lagarde, who went on to head the firm in 1999 and is now head 
of the International Monetary Fund. 
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description.80  Contemporary scholarship suggests that globalization is a 
more recent phenomenon than cosmopolitanism, which has an extensive 
history.  They are connected but not isomorphic.  Taking the history of 
cosmopolitanism, we can see how it gave rise to globalization as a mode of 
discourse about the world.  Cosmopolitanism and globalization reflect a 
deep involvement with the world and its cultures:  they envisage 
sensibilities that appreciate and celebrate difference.  By contrast, 
internationalism is flatter and less textured in that it concerns the relations 
between states rather than cosmopolitan incursion into cultures and 
sentiments.81  Cosmopolitanism, especially as articulated in terms of Held’s 
eight principles,82
Peter’s career, of which a small part has been shown here, is emblematic 
of the notion of a cosmopolitan that Appiah puts forward from the Cynics—
that the cosmopolitan is a citizen of the cosmos who perturbs by being 
skeptical of convention, and by being one who challenges orthodoxy.  
Therefore, the role of the cosmopolitan is to challenge, yet persuade, and 
include that which can be perceived as part of the republican ideal.  It 
endorses inclusiveness and community, yet does not disregard difference. 
 is contextual and involves agency. 
When we examine what Peter was doing in connection with both the 
nuclear industry and the global accounting business, we see this concept in 
practice.  Peter’s role was to assist in integrating disparate cultures into a 
cohesive entity that would take on a life of its own.  He achieved this, at the 
most mundane level, by mixing together different legal cultures, especially 
introducing the Swiss Verein into corporate life.  But at a more subtle level 
of complexity, Peter brought about a refocusing of the institutions in play 
from being atomized elements to becoming powerful cohesive 
organizations with global reach.  The discourse of differences had to be 
reconstituted into a conversation of commonality.  It is not something 
achieved overnight.  At first, it takes continuing negotiation and suasion to 
bring the different groups into a common understanding.  Then, it takes 
monitoring and reviewing to ensure that fission does not occur, as we saw 
with Peter’s own continuing involvement with the organizations he helped 
establish. 
In order to bring about these accomplishments successfully, Peter had to 
demonstrate his knowledge of, and sensibility to, different legal systems, 
 
 80. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (1973).  Geertz 
borrowed the term “thick description” from Gilbert Ryle. See Gilbert Ryle, The Thinking of 
Thoughts:  What Is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing? (Univ. Saskatchewan, Univ. Lecture Series No. 18) 
(1968), available at http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/CSACSIA/Vol14/Papers/ryle_1.html.  Ryle 
analyzed two boys moving their eyelids, which could be an intentional wink or an 
involuntary twitch of the eyelid.  A third boy then parodied the first boy’s wink. See id.  
Geertz believed we are suspended in webs of significance and that the role of thick 
description is to disentangle those webs so that we may fully understand the significance of 
action and symbols. See generally GEERTZ, supra. 
 81. See generally Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Internationalism:  Peace, War and 
Democracy, NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/doyle/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012) (observing that cosmopolitanism argues for accommodation and 
consensus within states, as well as across borders, and therefore avoids conflict and war). 
 82. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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different cultures, different societies, and different languages (geographic 
and professional), to reconcile the elements revolving in this socio-cultural-
legal space.  We say “socio-cultural-legal” because we are trying to capture 
something more than merely the legal aspect.  If Peter had no 
comprehension of the things mentioned, his task would have proved 
impossible.  This is not to say that Peter was unique, but he was part of a 
small cadre of lawyers who were able to undertake these kinds of roles.  
They were lawyers who explicitly resisted being technocrats.  Theirs was 
not the minutiae of the contract clause, but rather the conception of what the 
contract was trying to achieve and more. 
Moreover, there is an additive quality to this conception.  Peter had to 
demonstrate authority as well as sensibility in order to command a 
persuasive role.  It certainly came from his skill in law, but also in his 
capacity to tap into resources that would augment and reinforce his skill.  
The global law firm provided the infrastructure of his authority—
somewhere in the world there would be a source of expertise on hand to 
supply answers.  In addition to the authority of expertise, Peter introduced 
an authority that derived from his position in the law firm, that of an 
experienced and senior partner, one who was deeply involved in the 
management of the firm.  His clients, most of whom were senior members 
of their organizations, would acknowledge and understand his status, and 
find assurance in it.  These displays of authority, not explicit and overt, 
helped create the persona of the trusted advisor.  Peter’s position shaped the 
possibility and probability of assured reliance, and diminished and managed 
the potential for risk on which these clients’ enterprises were built. 
The emergence of new professional groups in the last forty years or so 
has affected the position and development of cosmopolitan lawyers and 
advisors.  Indeed, it may have attenuated their influence.  For example, 
management consultants and big accounting firms have assumed some of 
these roles and are involved in the creation of new regulatory structures.83
We close on the reason why we began this project.  It is because we see 
value in the ideal of the cosmopolitan lawyer.  Cosmopolitanism is a source 
of good in a world riven by cultural misunderstanding.  The rule of law and 
those who convey it need to be able to function in the world.  There is a 
need for translators and interpreters at a cultural level, who go beyond the 
trite.  Law firms may no longer be the most appropriate vehicles for 
imparting this knowledge.  Having now abandoned the central value of the 
  
Lawyers are retreating to a more technocratic role focused more on the 
construction and composition of documentation.  If this is true, where does 
this leave the cosmopolitan lawyer as we have portrayed him?  He is not 
bereft nor has he disappeared; he has assumed a new identity. 
 
 83. See Julia Black, The Development of Risk Based Regulation in Financial Services:  
Canada, the UK and Australia, ESRC CENTRE FOR ANALYSIS RISK & REG., LONDON SCH. 
ECON. (Sept. 2004), http://w.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publications%20full%20text/
black/risk%20based%20regulation%20in%20financial%20services.pdf (discussing the 
different approaches to risk-based regulation taken by three financial regulators, though none 
have successfully achieved a robust measure). 
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Cravath system—the training—they are more attuned to mass production.84
In Peter’s case, he has already made the shift.  He was instrumental in 
creating and developing a new legal education venture that would attempt 
to embody the values of cosmopolitanism and globalization.  
LawWithoutWalls, based, but not exclusively, at the University of Miami 
School of Law, has entered its second year with twelve law schools situated 
across nineteen time zones.
  
If this is the case, then imparting these ideals has to take place elsewhere.  
85
 
  For one semester each year, groups of 
students are exposed to an interdisciplinary mix of lawyers, entrepreneurs, 
social scientists, pedagogical techniques, technological innovations, and 
conversations that attempt to inculcate the ideals we have been describing 
in this Article.  We hope this is the rebirth of the cosmopolitan lawyer in a 
global setting. 
 
 84. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BROOKS, CHEAPER BY THE HOUR:  TEMPORARY LAWYERS AND 
THE DEPROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE LAW (2011) (analyzing the rise of the contract attorney 
in the legal profession and the deprofessionalization of legal work). 
 85. See About, LAWWITHOUTWALLS, http://www.lawwithoutwalls.org/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
